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The YPFS Lessons Learned Oral History Project
A Special Project: Inside the CDO Machine
Rosalind Z. Wiggins* and Andrew Metrick†
In this issue of the Journal of Financial Crisis, we feature Inside the CDO Machine—a special
undertaking recently completed under the auspices of the Yale Program on Financial
Stability Lessons Learned Oral History Project by Steven H. Kasoff, a Yale School of
Management Fellow and former equity partner and head of real estate and structured
products investments at the Elliott Management Corp., a global hedge fund. For the project,
Kasoff undertook a series of interviews with industry professionals to focus on one of the
critical derivatives products of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), and how they became so important to the events of the crisis.
As the Inside the CDO Machine project materials evidence, in the decade prior to the crisis,
new complex products, including CDOs, were developed that took advantage of the mortgage
boom and responded to the great investor demand for high-yield securities. “ABS CDOs
became the main investment vehicle for the riskiest investment-grade securities in the
private-label mortgage market.”1
In its final report on the causes of the GFC, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC)
found, among other things, that CDOs “turned out to be some of the most toxic assets during
the crisis”2 and were key elements in spreading risk throughout the financial system and in
accelerating the crisis.3
These CDOs—composed of the riskier tranches—fueled demand for nonprime
mortgage securitization and contributed to the housing bubble . . . Many of these risky

*

†

1

2

3

Director, the Global Financial Crisis Project, Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), Yale
School of Management, and Project Manager, the Lessons Learned Oral History Project, YPFS.
Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, and YPFS Founder and Director, Yale School of
Management.
See Greg Feldberg, Larry Cordell, and Danielle Sass, “The Role of ABS CDOs in the Financial Crisis,” Journal of
Structured Finance 25, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 10–27 [URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3443043].
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC). Website: Resource Library: CDO Library.
http://fcic.som.yale.edu/resource/staff-data-projects/cdo-Library.
FCIC, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011);
see “Chapter 8: The CDO Machine” (127–55) and “Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission”
(xv–xxviii).

368

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

assets ended up on the balance sheets of systemically important institutions and
contributed to their failure or near failure in the financial crisis.4
Scholars estimate that during the GFC, “write-downs on ABS CDOs [totaled] $410 billion . . .
with $325 billion assumed by AAA and ‘super-senior’ securities, which had minimal capital,
margin, or liquidity requirements.”5 Under then-existing regulations, some firms investing
in these securities were permitted to take on excessive leverage, “imperiling their solvency
and placing them at the center of the financial crisis.”6
As a former peer, Kasoff had unique access to the Inside the CDO Machine project
participants; could garner their confidence; and understood their language, nuances, and
anecdotes. This entrée allowed Kasoff, along with Matt Lieber, one of our Lessons Learned
interviewers, to question at length six individuals in key roles in the CDO business as it
evolved, exploring developments from inside the industry. In addition, Kasoff contributed
his own extensive interview.
Drawing upon his own experiences and these interviews, Kasoff has written a monograph,
“Anatomy of a Trade: The Making of a Subprime CDO,” a detailed and insightful parable that
illustrates the insiders’ points of view—the motives, structural maneuvering, and evolution
of this pivotal market. The form also makes the complicated topic accessible for most readers
and highlights the usefulness of the interviews as source material. This main work includes
a glossary of key terms and is accompanied by a companion piece, “Wall Street’s Subprime
Debacle: Firsthand Accounts from Inside the CDO Machine,” which provides details about the
project and participants:
Inside the CDO Machine
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•

Wall Street’s Subprime Debacle: Firsthand Accounts from Inside the CDO Machine—
by Matthew A. Lieber and Steven H. Kasoff

•

Anatomy of a Trade: The Making of a Subprime CDO
by Steven H. Kasoff

•

Lessons Learned Interview Summaries
o Steven H. Kasoff
o James Finkel
o Sohail Khan
o Stephen King
o Eric Kolchinsky
o Chris Ricciardi
o Brian Stoker

FCIC 2011, 155.
Cordell, Feldberg, and Sass 2019, 10.
Cordell, Feldberg, and Sass 2019, 10.

369

A Special Project: Inside the CDO Machine

Wiggins and Metrick

The full-length Inside the CDO Machine project interviews are available on the Lessons
Learned website. We urge you to explore them for their rich insights. Also available on the
website are dozens of other Lessons Learned interviews.
The Lessons Learned Oral History Project grew out of the Yale Program on Financial Stability
(YPFS), which began in 2013 with the mission to preserve, create, and share knowledge about
financial crises and how regulators and policymakers prevent, diagnose, and combat these rare
and unprecedented events. You may learn more about YPFS from our program website, and you
may access our published cases in the Journal of Financial Crises.
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